| The NZDF Files - Close Air Support
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01 November 2008
Introduction
Close Air Support (CAS) is the military
capacity and assets allowing for the security and protection of
naval and ground forces from the air. It includes, but is not limited
to, security and Force Protection against enemy or potentially hostile
conventional or unconventional sea, air and ground forces. Effectively
implemented it allows friendly forces to carry out their missions
unimpeded, regardless of the nature of those operations. The type
and quality of those assets and personnel providing this security
is directly proportional to a reduction in risk to personnel involved.
The notion of CAS in the New Zealand
context must be expressed with the background of the disbandment
of the Combat Air Wing. Sale of the Skyhawk fleet is currently underway
but has not been finalised. While there has been much public debate
on the issue of disbandment, such as the efforts of Save Our Squadrons
(SOS) this must be put aside in order to deal with the issue as
it currently stands. This includes analysing the practical needs
of a deployed NZDF force, requirements of training for potential
deployments, and alternatives within a CAS framework. In a tight
economic environment both globally and locally this must be done
in terms of cost benefit, while not dismissing how potential options
impact our broader geo-political relations.
While there are many ways in which
CAS can be provided to ground troops, the quality and effect in
place is counter-balanced with any willing financial outlay and
issues of personnel recruitment and training. As the outlay is reduced
the likely tactical risk to ground forces is increased. This is
directly reflected in operational effectiveness and therefore mission
accomplishment.
While much has been made of any potential
coalition partner providing CAS for deployed New Zealand forces,
self-reliance is lost and cohesive training is drastically reduced.
This has a detrimental effect on operational outcomes and therefore
the very decisions by government for the NZDF to be involved in
such actions.
Initial outlays of any major acquisition,
as it is within any portfolio of government, is substantial. Likewise,
it is recognised that to replace any existing assets in an increasingly
technological world, to keep up to date and credible, is also expensive.
If a need is identified, a replacement or upgrade required, or alternatively
as a cost in terms of outsourcing, it must be weighed up with those
options available and the practical effectiveness of those options.
A cost saving measure today may cost more in terms of upgrades,
compatibility and functionality tomorrow. It must also be stressed
that a cheaper (or less effective but nevertheless expensive) option,
in regards issues of Defence, may also cost the lives of our servicemen
and women in training or involved in operational duties.
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Overview
Air power has been shown to be a decisive
component of modern conflict since World War Two. Since then, New
Zealand involvement in operations such as Crete and the European
theatre, to CAS missions in Borneo, Malaya, Korea, and in Vietnam
where US planes were flown by New Zealand pilots, significantly
demonstrates a mixture of negative and positive outcomes for troops
on the ground.
During operations in East Timor, Australia
made it clear that, without the support and presence of New Zealand
strike aircraft to back up the deployment there, the mission could
not have gone ahead with any reasonable level of operational security.
Today, a like mission could not be sustained in this regard. These
examples only pertain to operations abroad, and typically concern
the support of units at the battalion level or lower.
At home, while the scenario of invasion
is lauded as implausible by many, this is restrictive in views of
national defence, particularly in a post 9/11 world. The term and
use of the word "invasion" is often within an outdated
context and restricted to that of a conventional war setting. Escalation
often occurs rapidly and is not conducive to ad-hoc responses. The
modern geopolitical environment is one not known for its predicability.
New Zealand's trade is almost solely
dependent on shipping lanes, thereby our geographical isolation
making us in fact more vulnerable than less so. While additional
maritime security will be provided via the Navy through Project
Protector vessels (two Off-shore Patrol Vessels, and four In-shore
Patrol Vessels), they are, like the Army's ground forces absent
of effective air support.
While the Air Force is able to provide
early warnings of threat it is unable to facilitate any reasonable
force against those threats. At the most basic level, it seems pointless
to be able to assess a threat without being able to counter it -
especially at short notice.
Considering New Zealand's remote location,
which in modern terms makes us more vulnerable in the wake of modern
technology, not less so as it was years ago, it is imperative that
some means comes by which we can counter any reasonably proposed
strategic, operational or tactical level threat to our territories
or those of our close neighbours.
Australia is hard pressed to meet
its own Defence needs and it would be both unwise and untenable
to lump them with the responsibility of defending our shores. Naval
assets alone here are stretched and perceived encounters must be
met with strong multi level resources to provide deterrents and
prevent escalation. Our isolation also emphasises that any threat
to our shores, although it may be detected could not be held off.
Distance is such that no other friendly nation could effectively
prevent such an unlikely yet very possible situation.
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SAS in Decline
The nature of modern warfare has changed
rapidly in just a few decades, and the methods and formations in
place are frequently slow to adapt. This is shown in the nature
of older generations often stuck in tradition, such as heavy armour
and artillery ideal for conventional confrontation based on a Cold
War type operational doctrine yet, current conflict is far more
involved in counter insurgency, peace support operations (PSO) and
Special Forces direct action and reconnaissance against irregular
opposing forces.
Smaller units, more flexible, with
higher levels of training and more rapidly deployable in a multitude
of roles is the order of the day. This however intrinsically dictates
that such forces require rapidly responsive force protection and
firepower brought to bear from external sources.
While this sort of support can be perceived
as a critical component of conventional warfighting (and it is)
this perception overshadows the requirement for unconventional operations
and those of coalition operations involving organisations such as
NATO or the United Nations.
The NZSAS, while recently gaining new
essential equipment loses its capacity to work with air power and
cannot guarantee they will receive the support provided by the frigate
force and Orions. As a former Commanding Officer of 1NZSAS Group
said:
"Without air combat SAS cannot
be qualified as FACs [Forward Air Controllers]. This is a fundamental
Special Forces skill. Combat air may well be the only form of
friendly fire that SAS may be able to call on to extricate selves
and more critically may be the destructive fire used in a mission.
The SAS FAC course was upgraded to
be NATO compliant. I had to train SAS to this standard for UN
peacekeeping. You can say 75 Squadron contributed directly to
the preparation of SAS for peacekeeping missions.
It is unclear whether the SAS will
receive funding for adequate levels of FAC training. If they do
not, that effectiveness will decline."
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