Raising a Third Regular Force Infantry Battalion

While there is call for a light infantry company for a rapid reaction capability this, while addressing the needs for light infantry despite the moblising of 1RNZIR with NZLAV, fails to deal with or reflect the critical issue of manning in regards the infantry role and in general. East Timor has seen the need to draw on other Corps to train and perform patrolling duties of infantry, while even recently Territorial Force (TF) personnel have been drawn upon to allow for operations in the Solomon Islands.

While reserve personnel perform critical roles in allowing for tour rotations they should not be a requirement in this capacity, rather an opportunity operationally for such personnel to gain experience in soldiering increasing their value to both operations and their respective units. As it stands it has consistently become mandatory for TF participation since 1999 to be active in these roles in order for Regular Forces to maintain acceptable levels of down time between missions. Even so, many soldiers were, as in the case of East Timor, compelled into repeated tours.

The addition of a single Infantry company does not permit for a complete rotation of a Battalion group and therefore one must be provided in an ad hoc fashion. The current capacity of two Regular Force (RF) battalions, one mobile and one light, does not allow for appropriate tactical, strategic or operational "one up, one in transit and one in training". The only realistic solution is the raising of a new battalion as the current situation is unsustainable, putting undue strain on Defence capabilities and human resources. It therefore contributes to unacceptable risks to personnel in the execution of their duties.

While proposing the raising of a additional battalion and its requirement is obvious even to the most left of political thinkers, it will only serve to remedy the manning issues aforementioned. While this is a big step in and of itself it does not assist in serving other substantial existing policy gaps.

The requirements for rapidly deployable light infantry forces are evident in recent times including the Solomon Islands, Tonga and East Timor. Reconnaissance capabilities are vital in all military operations and its effectiveness lays the seeds for success. This is substantial in the advocation of a light infantry ready reaction force company focusing in recce.

With the kinds of confusion and difficulties associated with assigning units new roles and tasks, and often on short notice for operational requirements it makes sense to press the acknowledged shortfalls in Defence policy with those of creating a new unit, thereby having it focus on the needs of government, the New Zealand Defence Forces and potential deployment necessities. This in additional also serves to implement and remedy those lessons of most recent experiences of the NZDF.

This leads to the conclusion that a newly raised RF infantry battalion should specialise in the requirements of ISTAR - Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance. While a single company within each RF battalion should consist of recce specialists for a battalion a specialist battalion allows for the utalisation of unit level assets and greater options for commanders both militarily and in the assistance of civil powers in times of major crisis or minor emergency.

These assets and the unit's proposed composition will be addressed at a later date. For the meantime it is enough to say that the contemporary Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) approach, molded to the recce focus would both suit the requirements of policy and provide the tactical flexibility to remain effective for all likely required contingencies. The CAB would include mobility elements, NZLAV assets equipped with the appropriate on board technologies, engineer and logistical sub units.

Additional contemporary experience and modern thinking has promoted the most flexible tactical approaches at the lowest possible levels, paving the way for more appropriate use of assets where and when they are needed on the battlefield and in OOTW (Operations other than War). This is somewhat different to historical methods where there has been much greater top down influence than is wise for modern operations.

This rethink may indeed have greater financial costs but in the interests of effective resolution and reduction of casualties on the ground it has already demonstrated the benefits of the adjusted mindset. Additionally, the investment in such a specialist battalion serves to reduce costs overall for what would otherwise be ad-hoc solutions as issues arise, both incurring greater costs financially but also upon personnel and operational effectiveness.

A dedicated Recce Battalion permits the countering of such counter productive environments while allowing for several rotational sub units as it pertains to the Ready Reaction Force Company.

In the short term it is suggested that the Recce Company of the proposed Battalion act as the required Ready Reaction Force (RRF) Company.

Other companies can provide necessary logistical support and specialist personnel and equipment as dictated by the operational environment. This will form the required company group appropriate deployment.

In terms of the need to achieve policy objectives this company would have priority within the Battalion with regards being raised. At a later stage other combat core sub units of the Battalion can rotate the responsibility of RRF duties. A six monthly rotation would reduce stresses on personnel regards regular training within the Battalion while giving an RRF unit adequate experience in that essential role.

Mobility squadron would provide one troop (likewise rotated) for the RRF in order that, if the RRF Company is deployed over the period in which they are on standby, they have adequate Force Protection, mobility and fire support.

[ ANZAC patrol - East Timor ]

Top ^

October 2007

Proposal of RNZAF Air Defence Company

New Zealand Defence Forces are severely vulnerable to air attack with only a limited capacity to protect its airspace against such threats. With the disbandment of the Combat Air Wing this has been infinitely increased. If we are unable to meet even a minimal threat of such nature out at sea, as the Skyhawks allowed, then as a cheaper but less effective counter to this problem Air Defence options is proposed.

This would consist of several batteries along our vast coastline. More critical and pressing is protection of operationally deployed units. The RNZAF would operate such forces in close cooperation with enhanced Army assets increasing interoperational capacity. All options can also be mounted on vehicles for higher levels of mobility and deployment.Such an option becomes even more pertinent with the disbanding of the Air Combat Wing. With both static and mobile forces of this kind we can have an adequate defence against incoming air attack. This does negate an ability to strike at any threat out at sea, but it does provide with additional early warning. Matched to Electronic Warfare (EW) of the RNZN this would provide the best means of national defence outside of reinstating an offensive air capacity.

It must be stressed, for a country of the geographical disposition of New Zealand, the best defence is good offence, the battle being fought out at sea, where our land assets, both civil and military, are at minimal risk.

New Zealand has not only a long reaching coastline but also distant strategic responsibilities to its neighbours. This strategic concern is intrinsically linked with trade and an ability to demonstrate the willingness to maintain these wider global concerns. The Navy gives New Zealand the ability, given appropriate assets, to provide anything from civil defence duties in outlying islands to providing direct security to military or humanitarian relief as has been demonstrated with East Timor.

It is accepted that to raise such a unit poses problems due to the challenges faced in regards retention and recruitment but, particularly for deployed forces, and issues of full spectrum force protection this can not be ignored.Regards vehicles for mobile units, 1RNZIR has the majority of NZLAV assets for mobilisation. The remainder constitute use for 2/1RNZIR, training and, theoretically armoured recce. Some of these vehicles, perhaps two six vehicle batteries and four additional for command and control would allow for a realistic and affordable anti-air component to the force. Ideally additional vehicles would be brought for the purpose but the aforementioned considers minimal cost and integration.

A proposed force would consist of three troops. One based in Auckland / Whenuapai, one in Linton / Ohakea and another in Christchurch / Burnham. The two North Island units would be drawn from the FSV roled LAV based in Linton presently. The South Island unit would be drawn from the QAMR.

Each of the three troops would consist of:

4x Air Defence (AD) armed LAV
1x Direct Fire (DF) 25mm turret armed LAV
1x Command Post (CP) LAV
4x LOV

The DF vehicle will have the usual 3+7 compliment for rapid mounted / dismounted reconnaissance, while the LOV will each have 1+5 for ammunition, logistical and troop self protection duties. Typical personnel per troop would be 57, of enhanced platoon in size.

The 18 vehicles would simply be re-roled from those allocated as of the Army's plan of 28 June 2004. They would be staffed by RNZAF and a NZ Army cadre. The concept provides a dual role of air cover for Army assets and air defence for air ports and Air Force assets.What follows is a brief on three possible systems:

Rapier

Rapier is used by Australia's 16 Air Defence (Light) Regiment 110 AD Battery. It is due for replacement in Australian service and it would be worth considering purchasing these weapons off Australia as a interim measure. They are still a viable option for another decade or more and this is purely a self defence acquisition for defending our lengthy coastline from air attack. Used with great effect in the Falklands, this system has a modern upgrade path, as shown with the UK Rapier 2000.

Logistics,initial training and support can be provided by either the UK or Australia.

Units like Singapore's Air Defence Brigade of the RSAF, whom are responsible for national air defence operations, use Rapier. Rapier is a battle tested system and has a solid record. Portable variants for mobility are available.

[ Swiss Army Rapier ]

Bofors RSB-70/90

This missile system is used by Australia's 16 Air Defence (Light) Regiment 111 AD Battery. This laser guided SAM is also used by the RSAF Divisional Air Defence Artillery Brigade. ARMAD is a three man turret version which holds the radar and Fire Control System (FCS) needed for self contained operation. It is let down by its relatively short range of five kilometres but RSB-70 is man portable, while also being more typically mounted on light vehicles. The RSB-90 has a greater range and more effective warhead thanks to the advances of technology.

[ Australian Army RSB 70/90 ]

ADATS

Air Defence Anti-tank System uses a dual purpose warhead meaning the system can engage both Armour and air targets, out to a range of 10 kilometres, while detection is over twice that. The platform has eight laser guided missiles ready for launch. Two men can reload the ADATS without need for additional logistical support. A six unit battery can be linked to a common network, elements upto 20 kilometres apart sharing battlefield data. Both armoured mobile and static defence options are available.

With NZLAV now in service the Army could most certainly look into the feasibility of placing the weapons and targeting systems of ADATS onto these vehicles.

Switzerland use the ADATS on wheeled vehicles. It would provide a solid standoff engagement of any modern armoured vehicles. Main Battle Tanks have typical main gun range of three kilometres. Such a system therefore permits much greater protection of the asset. It also provides (mounted on NZLAV) a rapid deployment with the force it intends to protect. This compliments Javelin MAAW dismounted 2000 metre range.

Both Canada and the Royal Thai Air Force use ADATS, as well as Switzerland. The system is a joint project between Switzerland and Canada through Oerlikon Aerospace Inc. A Mk2 ADATS updating of technologies will keep this option on the leading edge of the battlefield for many years to come.

It should be stressed that, if the multi-role ADATS was adopted, the FSV role would persist, with the given vehicles simply in the Anti-tank role with increased range and lethality.

[ M113 mounted ADATS ]

Top ^

November 2008

Close Air Support

Introduction

Close Air Support (CAS) is the military capacity and assets allowing for the security and protection of naval and ground forces from the air. It includes, but is not limited to, security and Force Protection against enemy or potentially hostile conventional or unconventional sea, air and ground forces. Effectively implemented it allows friendly forces to carry out their missions unimpeded, regardless of the nature of those operations. The type and quality of those assets and personnel providing this security is directly proportional to a reduction in risk to personnel involved.

The notion of CAS in the New Zealand context must be expressed with the background of the disbandment of the Combat Air Wing. Sale of the Skyhawk fleet is currently underway but has not been finalised. While there has been much public debate on the issue of disbandment, such as the efforts of Save Our Squadrons (SOS) this must be put aside in order to deal with the issue as it currently stands. This includes analysing the practical needs of a deployed NZDF force, requirements of training for potential deployments, and alternatives within a CAS framework. In a tight economic environment both globally and locally this must be done in terms of cost benefit, while not dismissing how potential options impact our broader geo-political relations.

While there are many ways in which CAS can be provided to ground troops, the quality and effect in place is counter-balanced with any willing financial outlay and issues of personnel recruitment and training. As the outlay is reduced the likely tactical risk to ground forces is increased. This is directly reflected in operational effectiveness and therefore mission accomplishment.

While much has been made of any potential coalition partner providing CAS for deployed New Zealand forces, self-reliance is lost and cohesive training is drastically reduced. This has a detrimental effect on operational outcomes and therefore the very decisions by government for the NZDF to be involved in such actions.

Initial outlays of any major acquisition, as it is within any portfolio of government, is substantial. Likewise, it is recognised that to replace any existing assets in an increasingly technological world, to keep up to date and credible, is also expensive. If a need is identified, a replacement or upgrade required, or alternatively as a cost in terms of outsourcing, it must be weighed up with those options available and the practical effectiveness of those options. A cost saving measure today may cost more in terms of upgrades, compatibility and functionality tomorrow. It must also be stressed that a cheaper (or less effective but nevertheless expensive) option, in regards issues of Defence, may also cost the lives of our servicemen and women in training or involved in operational duties.

Top ^

Overview

Air power has been shown to be a decisive component of modern conflict since World War Two. Since then, New Zealand involvement in operations such as Crete and the European theatre, to CAS missions in Borneo, Malaya, Korea, and in Vietnam where US planes were flown by New Zealand pilots, significantly demonstrates a mixture of negative and positive outcomes for troops on the ground.

During operations in East Timor, Australia made it clear that, without the support and presence of New Zealand strike aircraft to back up the deployment there, the mission could not have gone ahead with any reasonable level of operational security. Today, a like mission could not be sustained in this regard. These examples only pertain to operations abroad, and typically concern the support of units at the battalion level or lower.

At home, while the scenario of invasion is lauded as implausible by many, this is restrictive in views of national defence, particularly in a post 9/11 world. The term and use of the word "invasion" is often within an outdated context and restricted to that of a conventional war setting. Escalation often occurs rapidly and is not conducive to ad-hoc responses. The modern geopolitical environment is one not known for its predicability.

New Zealand's trade is almost solely dependent on shipping lanes, thereby our geographical isolation making us in fact more vulnerable than less so. While additional maritime security will be provided via the Navy through Project Protector vessels (two Off-shore Patrol Vessels, and four In-shore Patrol Vessels), they are, like the Army's ground forces absent of effective air support.

While the Air Force is able to provide early warnings of threat it is unable to facilitate any reasonable force against those threats. At the most basic level, it seems pointless to be able to assess a threat without being able to counter it - especially at short notice.

Considering New Zealand's remote location, which in modern terms makes us more vulnerable in the wake of modern technology, not less so as it was years ago, it is imperative that some means comes by which we can counter any reasonably proposed strategic, operational or tactical level threat to our territories or those of our close neighbours.

Australia is hard pressed to meet its own Defence needs and it would be both unwise and untenable to lump them with the responsibility of defending our shores. Naval assets alone here are stretched and perceived encounters must be met with strong multi level resources to provide deterrents and prevent escalation. Our isolation also emphasises that any threat to our shores, although it may be detected could not be held off. Distance is such that no other friendly nation could effectively prevent such an unlikely yet very possible situation.

[ A4 Skyhawk ]

Top ^

SAS in Decline

The nature of modern warfare has changed rapidly in just a few decades, and the methods and formations in place are frequently slow to adapt. This is shown in the nature of older generations often stuck in tradition, such as heavy armour and artillery ideal for conventional confrontation based on a Cold War type operational doctrine yet, current conflict is far more involved in counter insurgency, peace support operations (PSO) and Special Forces direct action and reconnaissance against irregular opposing forces.

Smaller units, more flexible, with higher levels of training and more rapidly deployable in a multitude of roles is the order of the day. This however intrinsically dictates that such forces require rapidly responsive force protection and firepower brought to bear from external sources.

While this sort of support can be perceived as a critical component of conventional warfighting (and it is) this perception overshadows the requirement for unconventional operations and those of coalition operations involving organisations such as NATO or the United Nations.

The NZSAS, while recently gaining new essential equipment loses its capacity to work with air power and cannot guarantee they will receive the support provided by the frigate force and Orions. As a former Commanding Officer of 1NZSAS Group said:

"Without air combat SAS cannot be qualified as FACs [Forward Air Controllers]. This is a fundamental Special Forces skill. Combat air may well be the only form of friendly fire that SAS may be able to call on to extricate selves and more critically may be the destructive fire used in a mission.

The SAS FAC course was upgraded to be NATO compliant. I had to train SAS to this standard for UN peacekeeping. You can say 75 Squadron contributed directly to the preparation of SAS for peacekeeping missions.

It is unclear whether the SAS will receive funding for adequate levels of FAC training. If they do not, that effectiveness will decline."

Top ^

October 2007

New Zealand Light Armoured Vehicle (NZLAV)

While there is little point in screaming after the horse has bolted, there is some validity in addressing issues which might prevent other horses from bolting in the future. Perhaps discussion may better hold to account the stable hands, or more specifically, those further up the food chain.

Here, the subject of debate is the purchase of the Light Armoured Vehicle (NZLAV) for service with the New Zealand Army. The $672 million price tag paid by Kiwi taxpayers came and went without so much as a peep of public. The positives of this third generation 8x8 wheeled vehicle are well documented by those who benefit from the big-ticket sales. But its not the positives that get people killed on active duty. This, sadly, driven home by a government slow to act on replacement of 1960s era M113 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APC) in the first, and in the same motion disband any air cover the new vehicles may have had of our own volition (A4 Skyhawks) in the second.

The government has promoted the NZLAV as the “preferred option” of the New Zealand Army. I would suggest that, after decades of outdated equipment, they would take anything they could get their mitts on. After a somewhat skewered tender process already well publicised, such a statement is questionable at best. Advantages of range and speed have been presented as key over those vehicles (M113 and Scorpion) it replaces.

Citing speed is a misnomer. Your vehicle cannot do its job if it has not been able to get to its objective in the first place, having been ambushed by militia or having got stuck in a bog on the way. The NZLAV is a behemoth of a machine, a much larger target than the M113. Speed is of little use when in tight urban areas and addressing the inevitable choke points of such battlefields. Turning circles, unlike tracked vehicles are less than ideal for any potential tactical environment. Additionally wheeled vehicle crews must carefully choose their route. The terrain dictates to them, opening them up for increased tactical compromise. Survival is about mobility, which is not always about speed. One vehicle, being pulled out of a bog requires at least one to do the pulling and several more to provide security. A stuck vehicle cannot move and is unacceptably vulnerable to enemy fire.

A critical point in regards the proponents of the LAVIII is their ongoing comparison of it to the older generation machines it replaces. This includes comparing the NZLAV with earlier generations of type - such as the Australian ASLAV (second generation or LAVII based models). It is rarely compared to its contemporaries either tracked or wheeled. This would produce results not conducive to LAVIII advantage. Much is made of advanced electronics and gunnery systems. Equivalent technology is mounted on any number of alternative vehicle options. One could argue the disturbing nature of a marketing ploy over a realistic analysis of individual vehicular capabilities on their own merits.

Soldiers advocate the vehicle because they have no choice professionally. Big business dictates at the end of the day, not what is best suited for our needs. Politicians decide what our needs are, not soldiers in the field. But Kiwis finally got something modern, right?

Armour is both central to the argument and critical to vehicle and personnel survival. While it is somewhat more limited on a wheeled chassis the NZLAV’s keel shaped hull offers substantial protection against mines. Tracked vehicles provide inherently lower silhouettes and superior reliability from the simplicity of their mechanics. This benefits survivability and therefore those people who serve with them. Tire costs and more complex suspension outweigh any notion of financial advantage of wheeled LAV type options. Fuel consumption is only advantageous on adequate roads. Most battlefields and peacekeeping operations tend towards less than ideal road conditions.

Additional appliqué armour for protection against common as mud rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers and heavy machine guns (HMG) wreaks havoc with driving characteristics putting crew and mounted infantry at risk. Modern warheads now available for the RPG, which have destroyed even US Abrams tanks in Iraq, means additional armour is no longer negotiable. Our own Chief of Defence Force (CDF) Lieutenant General Jerry Mateparae uses the argument that any armoured vehicle can be destroyed. Of course – Israel has demonstrated this long before Iraq. The point is this: A MBT can’t be shredded by a heavy machine gun – a notoriously common weapon amongst militia. Neither can a tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), such as the UK Warrior.

While the Army News reported a demonstration of the inadequacies of the obsolete M113 armour, hitting it with everything from a small arms to the Carl Gustav 84mm anti-armour rocket launcher, we did not see even a section of NZLAV armour next to it subjected to the same treatment for comparison.

The irony is soldiers are often better off dismounted. This works in regards deployment as the NZLAV is intended as a battle taxi, bringing the infantry to the battlefield, where they fight as light infantry.

Survivability, combat capability and self-defence require fire support. The NZLAV mounts a 25mm Bushmaster cannon in an advanced two-man turret. While the NZLAV’s lack of organic serious anti-armour and indirect fire weapons (such as mortars or grenade launchers to engage targets in defilade) suits the government idea of what the Army needs, relatively recent operational experience such as Bosnia contradicts this. It also contradicts government policy on the prevailing warfare in which New Zealanders find themselves involved.

An effective armoured vehicle coupled with adequate firepower is able to provide a realistic deterrent against hostility. That is, prevent combat from happening in the first instance. If a hostile force has a readily exploitable means presented to them, then peacekeepers, those providing humanitarian aid and security, are put at unnecessary risk. This includes a lack of air cover or inadequate full spectrum weapons to counter a multitude of treat types on the battlefield. The benefits of increased mobility are limited or impossible to implement in close country such as bush and jungle, and dangerous in urban built up areas, as Iraq and Grozny will attest.

Anti-tank (AT) and surface to air (SAM) missile systems can be mounted to counter those particular threats. The NZLAV organically lacks either capacity. The New Zealand Army has recently acquired Mistral very low air defence (VLAD) missile systems, a last resort for infantry defence against airborne attack, and the Javelin anti-tank guided weapon. Both are deployed by dismounted troops independent of the NZLAV who therefore loss any benefit of its armour.

A debate in September last year between Phil Goff and questioning ministers, regarding the NZLAV, found the Defence Minister saying that the new vehicle would be “of critical importance because of their mobility and their ability to do convoy escorts” if our troops found themselves in a situation like Bosnia again.

On Kiwi Company’s deployment to Bosnia the theatre demonstrated airborne and hard armour (tanks) assets are a very real threat to our deployed soldiers. We now have Javelin as a result. My question would be, why is this after the facts? Our soldiers should not need to have to call on allies for the most basic of equipment in any given theatre of war.

It is only a matter of time before reactionary policy-making costs New Zealand soldiers their lives. Common sense solutions often don’t provide the right people with the right amount of cash. This is how history tends to repeat itself.

The Army has a retention problem. Numerous soldiers have left the ranks based on the adoption of the NZLAV alone. The Army is not fortunate to be replacing such soldiers with young recruits who lack experience to know anything other than the LAV concept.

Those who remain are not about to upset the apple cart for fear of jeopardising their careers.

While nothing is ever absolute, there are ways and means of improving the odds. More questions need to be asked of procurements in the future. More importantly, they need to be answered honestly. In the field it is the soldier who dies, not the politician. It is the soldier who pays the price for decisions made to benefit big business of arms industry ilk. These deals have very little to do with benefiting those who serve.

[ US Army LAV Stryker ]

Top ^