| The NZDF Files - Requirement
for an Additional Infantry Battalion
†
23 February 2007
Third Regular Force Infantry
Battalion
While there is call for a light infantry
company for a rapid reaction capability this, while addressing the
needs for light infantry despite the moblising of 1RNZIR with NZLAV,
fails to deal with or reflect the critical issue of manning in regards
the infantry role and in general. East Timor has seen the need to
draw on other Corps to train and perform patrolling duties of infantry,
while even recently Territorial Force (TF) personnel have been drawn
upon to allow for operations in the Solomon Islands.
While reserve personnel perform critical
roles in allowing for tour rotations they should not be a requirement
in this capacity, rather an opportunity operationally for such personnel
to gain experience in soldiering increasing their value to both
operations and their respective units. As it stands it has consistently
become mandatory for TF participation since 1999 to be active in
these roles in order for Regular Forces to maintain acceptable levels
of down time between missions. Even so, many soldiers were, as in
the case of East Timor, compelled into repeated tours.
The addition of a single Infantry company
does not permit for a complete rotation of a Battalion group and
therefore one must be provided in an ad hoc fashion. The current
capacity of two Regular Force (RF) battalions, one mobile and one
light, does not allow for appropriate tactical, strategic or operational
"one up, one in transit and one in training". The only
realistic solution is the raising of a new battalion as the current
situation is unsustainable, putting undue strain on Defence capabilities
and human resources. It therefore contributes to unacceptable risks
to personnel in the execution of their duties.
While proposing the raising of a additional
battalion and its requirement is obvious even to the most left of
political thinkers, it will only serve to remedy the manning issues
aforementioned. While this is a big step in and of itself it does
not assist in serving other substantial existing policy gaps.
The requirements for rapidly deployable
light infantry forces are evident in recent times including the
Solomon Islands, Tonga and East Timor. Reconnaissance capabilities
are vital in all military operations and its effectiveness lays
the seeds for success. This is substantial in the advocation of
a light infantry ready reaction force company focusing in recce.
With the kinds of confusion and difficulties
associated with assigning units new roles and tasks, and often on
short notice for operational requirements it makes sense to press
the acknowledged shortfalls in Defence policy with those of creating
a new unit, thereby having it focus on the needs of government,
the New Zealand Defence Forces and potential deployment necessities.
This in additional also serves to implement and remedy those lessons
of most recent experiences of the NZDF.
This leads to the conclusion that a
newly raised RF infantry battalion should specialise in the requirements
of ISTAR - Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance.
While a single company within each RF battalion should consist of
recce specialists for a battalion a specialist battalion allows
for the utalisation of unit level assets and greater options for
commanders both militarily and in the assistance of civil powers
in times of major crisis or minor emergency.
These assets and the unit's proposed
composition will be addressed at a later date. For the meantime
it is enough to say that the contemporary Combined Arms Battalion
(CAB) approach, molded to the recce focus would both suit the requirements
of policy and provide the tactical flexibility to remain effective
for all likely required contingencies. The CAB would include mobility
elements, NZLAV assets equipped with the appropriate on board technologies,
engineer and logistical sub units.
Additional contemporary experience
and modern thinking has promoted the most flexible tactical approaches
at the lowest possible levels, paving the way for more appropriate
use of assets where and when they are needed on the battlefield
and in OOTW (Operations other than War). This is somewhat different
to historical methods where there has been much greater top down
influence than is wise for modern operations.
This rethink may indeed have greater
financial costs but in the interests of effective resolution and
reduction of casualties on the ground it has already demonstrated
the benefits of the adjusted mindset. Additionally, the investment
in such a specialist battalion serves to reduce costs overall for
what would otherwise be ad-hoc solutions as issues arise, both incurring
greater costs financially but also upon personnel and operational
effectiveness.
A dedicated Recce Battalion permits
the countering of such counter productive environments while allowing
for several rotational sub units as it pertains to the Ready Reaction
Force Company.
In the short term it is suggested that
the Recce Company of the proposed Battalion act as the required
Ready Reaction Force (RRF) Company.
Other companies can provide necessary
logistical support and specialist personnel and equipment as dictated
by the operational environment. This will form the required company
group appropriate deployment.
In terms of the need to achieve policy objectives this company would
have priority within the Battalion with regards being raised. At
a later stage other combat core sub units of the Battalion can rotate
the responsibility of RRF duties. A six monthly rotation would reduce
stresses on personnel regards regular training within the Battalion
while giving an RRF unit adequate experience in that essential role.
Mobility squadron would provide one troop (likewise rotated) for
the RRF in order that, if the RRF Company is deployed over the period
in which they are on standby, they have adequate Force Protection,
mobility and fire support.
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