| NZLAV - in a World of Conflict
†
October 2007
While there is little point in screaming after the
horse has bolted, there is some validity in addressing issues which
might prevent other horses from bolting in the future. Perhaps discussion
may better hold to account the stable hands, or more specifically,
those further up the food chain.
Here, the subject of debate is the purchase of the
Light Armoured Vehicle (NZLAV) for service with the New Zealand
Army. The $672 million price tag paid by Kiwi taxpayers came and
went without so much as a peep of public. The positives of this
third generation 8x8 wheeled vehicle are well documented by those
who benefit from the big-ticket sales. But its not the positives
that get people killed on active duty. This, sadly, driven home
by a government slow to act on replacement of 1960s era M113 Armoured
Personnel Carriers (APC) in the first, and in the same motion disband
any air cover the new vehicles may have had of our own volition
(A4 Skyhawks) in the second.
The government has promoted the NZLAV as the “preferred
option” of the New Zealand Army. I would suggest that, after
decades of outdated equipment, they would take anything they could
get their mitts on. After a somewhat skewered tender process already
well publicised, such a statement is questionable at best. Advantages
of range and speed have been presented as key over those vehicles
(M113 and Scorpion) it replaces.
Citing speed is a misnomer. Your vehicle cannot
do its job if it has not been able to get to its objective in the
first place, having been ambushed by militia or having got stuck
in a bog on the way. The NZLAV is a behemoth of a machine, a much
larger target than the M113. Speed is of little use when in tight
urban areas and addressing the inevitable choke points of such battlefields.
Turning circles, unlike tracked vehicles are less than ideal for
any potential tactical environment. Additionally wheeled vehicle
crews must carefully choose their route. The terrain dictates to
them, opening them up for increased tactical compromise. Survival
is about mobility, which is not always about speed. One vehicle,
being pulled out of a bog requires at least one to do the pulling
and several more to provide security. A stuck vehicle cannot move
and is unacceptably vulnerable to enemy fire.
A critical point in regards the proponents of the
LAVIII is their ongoing comparison of it to the older generation
machines it replaces. This includes comparing the NZLAV with earlier
generations of type - such as the Australian ASLAV (second generation
or LAVII based models). It is rarely compared to its contemporaries
either tracked or wheeled. This would produce results not conducive
to LAVIII advantage. Much is made of advanced electronics and gunnery
systems. Equivalent technology is mounted on any number of alternative
vehicle options. One could argue the disturbing nature of a marketing
ploy over a realistic analysis of individual vehicular capabilities
on their own merits.
Soldiers advocate the vehicle because they have
no choice professionally. Big business dictates at the end of the
day, not what is best suited for our needs. Politicians decide what
our needs are, not soldiers in the field. But Kiwis finally got
something modern, right?
Armour is both central to the argument and critical
to vehicle and personnel survival. While it is somewhat more limited
on a wheeled chassis the NZLAV’s keel shaped hull offers substantial
protection against mines. Tracked vehicles provide inherently lower
silhouettes and superior reliability from the simplicity of their
mechanics. This benefits survivability and therefore those people
who serve with them. Tire costs and more complex suspension outweigh
any notion of financial advantage of wheeled LAV type options. Fuel
consumption is only advantageous on adequate roads. Most battlefields
and peacekeeping operations tend towards less than ideal road conditions.
Additional appliqué armour for protection
against common as mud rocket propelled grenade (RPG) launchers and
heavy machine guns (HMG) wreaks havoc with driving characteristics
putting crew and mounted infantry at risk. Modern warheads now available
for the RPG, which have destroyed even US Abrams tanks in Iraq,
means additional armour is no longer negotiable. Our own Chief of
Defence Force (CDF) Lieutenant General Jerry Mateparae uses the
argument that any armoured vehicle can be destroyed. Of course –
Israel has demonstrated this long before Iraq. The point is this:
A MBT can’t be shredded by a heavy machine gun – a notoriously
common weapon amongst militia. Neither can a tracked Infantry Fighting
Vehicle (IFV), such as the UK Warrior.
While the Army News reported a demonstration of
the inadequacies of the obsolete M113 armour, hitting it with everything
from a small arms to the Carl Gustav 84mm anti-armour rocket launcher,
we did not see even a section of NZLAV armour next to it subjected
to the same treatment for comparison.
The irony is soldiers are often better off dismounted.
This works in regards deployment as the NZLAV is intended as a battle
taxi, bringing the infantry to the battlefield, where they fight
as light infantry.
Survivability, combat capability and self-defence
require fire support. The NZLAV mounts a 25mm Bushmaster cannon
in an advanced two-man turret. While the NZLAV’s lack of organic
serious anti-armour and indirect fire weapons (such as mortars or
grenade launchers to engage targets in defilade) suits the government
idea of what the Army needs, relatively recent operational experience
such as Bosnia contradicts this. It also contradicts government
policy on the prevailing warfare in which New Zealanders find themselves
involved.
An effective armoured vehicle coupled with adequate
firepower is able to provide a realistic deterrent against hostility.
That is, prevent combat from happening in the first instance. If
a hostile force has a readily exploitable means presented to them,
then peacekeepers, those providing humanitarian aid and security,
are put at unnecessary risk. This includes a lack of air cover or
inadequate full spectrum weapons to counter a multitude of treat
types on the battlefield. The benefits of increased mobility are
limited or impossible to implement in close country such as bush
and jungle, and dangerous in urban built up areas, as Iraq and Grozny
will attest.
Anti-tank (AT) and surface to air (SAM) missile
systems can be mounted to counter those particular threats. The
NZLAV organically lacks either capacity. The New Zealand Army has
recently acquired Mistral very low air defence (VLAD) missile systems,
a last resort for infantry defence against airborne attack, and
the Javelin anti-tank guided weapon. Both are deployed by dismounted
troops independent of the NZLAV who therefore loss any benefit of
its armour.
A debate in September last year between Phil Goff
and questioning ministers, regarding the NZLAV, found the Defence
Minister saying that the new vehicle would be “of critical
importance because of their mobility and their ability to do convoy
escorts” if our troops found themselves in a situation like
Bosnia again.
On Kiwi Company’s deployment to Bosnia the
theatre demonstrated airborne and hard armour (tanks) assets are
a very real threat to our deployed soldiers. We now have Javelin
as a result. My question would be, why is this after the facts?
Our soldiers should not need to have to call on allies for the most
basic of equipment in any given theatre of war.
It is only a matter of time before reactionary policy-making
costs New Zealand soldiers their lives. Common sense solutions often
don’t provide the right people with the right amount of cash.
This is how history tends to repeat itself.
The Army has a retention problem. Numerous soldiers
have left the ranks based on the adoption of the NZLAV alone. The
Army is not fortunate to be replacing such soldiers with young recruits
who lack experience to know anything other than the LAV concept.
Those who remain are not about to upset the apple
cart for fear of jeopardising their careers.
While nothing is ever absolute, there are ways and
means of improving the odds. More questions need to be asked of
procurements in the future. More importantly, they need to be answered
honestly. In the field it is the soldier who dies, not the politician.
It is the soldier who pays the price for decisions made to benefit
big business of arms industry ilk. These deals have very little
to do with benefiting those who serve.
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