| The NZDF Files - Issues of National
Defence
26 October 2008
NZDF Annual Report 2007-2008
This log intends to make some comments
on the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) Annual Report of the period
2007-2008. While the media has brought public awareness to issues
such as the degradation of the fleet of Skyhawks intended for sale,
and the death of a sailor on board HMNZS Canterbury recently, the
Annual Report outlines issues which are pertinent to the requirements
of the Armed Forces to carry out the tasks assigned and expected
of them. Unfortunately, both avenues also make clear numerous shortfalls
in regards capacity to that end.
It is important for these realities
to be forwarded to the public to whom the NZDF serve, but also that
the government act on these shortfalls, in whatever manner possible.
If the existence of the Armed Forces and its capacity to fulfill
even rudimentary tasks is seen as peripheral then any attempts to
maintain, update or enhance existing capacities, in respect to equipments,
manpower or otherwise, will be seen in the same light.
In a broad sweep, the Army now has
Javelin in service, giving them a modern anti-armour capacity for
Force Protection, and up to date communications equipment. For the
Navy Project Protector has brought into service critical fleet assets,
including the Multi-role Vessel (MRV) Canterbury, and both Inshore
and Offshore Patrol Vessels are progressively being commissioned
The two Frigates Te Kaha and Te Mana received C4I (Command, Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence) upgrades. For the RNZAF
new helicopters including the NH90 and the A109 will replace aging
Iroquois and Sioux which have reached well beyond any reasonably
expected service life. Keep in mind, while all these points are
positive, all new major asset procurements are critical to the future
of the NZDF and its ability to function as a viable modern force.
This must be put into a contemporary
context, both in terms of service at home, and abroad. A capacity
to assist in civil emergencies, to assist island nations in the
region, and Australia, in similar situations, and to meet and permit
safe operations in both peacekeeping and warfighting environments.
It is unreasonable of a civil society to expect anything less from
the government of the day on behalf of those who serve in the Armed
Forces.
While our first priority should be
that of protecting New Zealand and its regional and local interests,
this does not mean we should leave our friends out in the cold.
If, for example, a situation like East Timor were to occur again,
the only way we could commit to such an operation is to withdraw
numerous troops from overseas deployments. While in some areas this
would have minimal impact, elsewhere it would leave substantial
holes in operational capacity for those left with additional burdens
of responsibility. This would certainly not be a good sign in a
country which likes to claim to "do its bit".
The following thoughts are related
primarily to section 4 of the Report, NZDF Statement of Service
Performance. I've split the discussion by branch. It is intended
as a summary.
New Zealand Army
This section I will quote the Report
at the beginning of the section outlining issues pertaining to the
Army.
"Even though a battalion
group has not been deployed, the accumulative effect of three
ongoing, concurrent operational deployments in Afghanistan (company
group), Timor–Leste (company group), and Solomon Islands
(enhanced platoon), is causing significant tension between the
provision of forces for current operations, and being ready for
future and potentially more lethal operations. In essence, when
Army Force Elements deploy to the current theatres of operation,
they lose a significant proportion of their combat capability,
which had been achieved to that point. Upon return they must rebuild
for higher EC scenarios. This tension is the key issue facing
Army."
While we are not talking about an enhanced
Battalion group, such as was deployed to East Timor in 1999, the
collective sub-units detailed above reinforce an equivalence and
the resulting effects on personnel. Without major withdrawals from
the above mentioned operations the NZDF would be unable to raise,
maintain and sustain an equivalent operational unit were it necessary.
Overseas commitments has made it impossible for the Army to be able
to commit a Battalion in this manner, as required under EC2. It
impedes on many other requirements expected by government. Additionally,
some exercises requiring deployed personnel could not take place.
Training standards suffer, as do qualifications requirements, particularly
above the company level.
While new critical equipment has been
introduced, there is an inability to cater for contingencies, generally
beyond that pertaining to our own shores and anything operationally
beyond peacekeeping. Higher threat level contingencies are either
difficult or impossible to achieve. Technical and equipment support
tends to be procurable to meet requirements so long as it does not
go above the company level.
Manning issues are reflected in the
fact that personnel from 16 Field Regiment had to re-role for light
infantry duties for Afghanistan. It is able to provide a six gun
battery in support of a deployed force. The VLLAD troop, equipped
with Mistral has been unable to obtain a directed level of capacity.
Part of this is due to the slow acquirement of the required technologies
enabling the weapon systems deployment. The Report also points out
that is is further slowed by the fact that the Troop personnel is
required to deploy to Timor-Leste as light infantry, again due to
manning shortages.
Artillery Forward Observer (FO) training
and Forward air Controller (FAC) is in shortage and this highly
diminishes the effectiveness of fire support missions. The latter
is particularly significant to Special Operations missions and a
capacity to train for same. These must be ratified in the case that
operational deployment became necessary as there are requirements
for external organisations in this skill sets, such as NATO.
In relation to Special Operations
the Report makes it clear that any major commitment of the NZSAS
in support of land force operations would mean the Army would be
unable to "provide, concurrently, a like commitment to another
operation/mission". It takes time to deploy, to retrain, and
redeploy to another area of operations. So, for example, it would
be untenable for Special Operations to be involved in substantial
numbers in Afghanistan, and also in our own region. A Counter Terrorist
force is treated separately in this regard and is maintained for
such contingencies within New Zealand. The new CBRE/IEDD (Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, Explosive, Improvised Explosive Device
Disposal) elements are being implemented.
Royal New Zealand Navy
While the frigates have been committed
to low level local and South Pacific security tasks, the commissioning
of the two OPV will take some strain off these primary vessels.
The shortage of marine technicians reported meant that Te Kaha remained
in port for longer than desired. Otherwise the two frigates were
able to output as required, including Te Mana's Persian Gulf operations.
Interoperability with allies is stated
as having been achieved. This is helped with various technological
upgrades, the C4I is significant.
Experience required of personnel, as
it is across the Armed Forces, is frequently lacking. This comes
from a combination of retention problems of trained personnel and
time taken for new recruits to gain that required experience. If
there is one overbearing issue present for the NZDF it is related
to personnel in this way. Training takes time initially and to maintain,
while loss of experienced personnel has far more impact than simply
the loss of an individual. Of note is that, while more critical
tasks have been catered for, this has often been at the cost of
other areas within the Navy. Noteworthy is the inability to "fill
established Senior and Leading Hand Diving positions on HMNZS Manawanui".
There has been quite a lot in the public
arena concerning the HMNZS Canterbury. As a result it has been unable
to achieve operational readiness. A number of issues have to be
addressed for the MRV and there have been two Courts of Inquiry
regarding the vessel's serviceability. Both Endeavour (Tanker) and
Canterbury have been involved in exercises with Australia, France
and China.
The OPV (Wellington and Otago) and
IPV (Rotoiti, Hawea, Pukaki and Taupo) deliveries were delayed and
therefore not available for service. With the decommissioning of
the four IPC these new vessels become increasingly critical to maintain
a minimum level of security capability.
Royal New Zealand Air Force
Requirements of the P-3 in regards
communications, weapons and self-protection is below par but projects
are in place to address these issues. All these elements are essential
to permit safe operations. Upgrade programs are generally behind
schedule and stores and munitions are insufficient beyond those
required for short term and low threat contingencies.
While there is a standing intention
for Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) at the strategic level and C-130s
can provide this, none are equipped for the essential role and there
are no personnel assigned to the tasking. Limited tactical AE capability
utalising UH-1 rotary wing is present but restricted by way of personnel
requirements - there is a need for Army personnel to be present
currently but it is a requirement of the RNZAF to provide these
crew.
The rotary wing assets continue to
suffer from age and wear related reliability, and are restricted
in regards bad weather, night flying and extremes of temperature.
These issues have been present for a number of years but will be
addressed by the introduction of new aircraft, the NH-90 and the
A109.
A lack of flying hours have shown to
hamper ideal levels of readiness and like the Army equipments, supply
and training limitations limit air assets and personnel for anything
beyond minimal threat scenarios. Particularly noted here is the
Seasprite aircraft for the Navy, though embarked flying hours were
achieved. Critical manning issues meant that the RNZAF could not
obtain required air and ground personnel levels.
Conclusion
While we can look to overseas and recognise
that other Western nations are suffering, in respect to their GDP,
operational stresses and manning issues, we must make (and be seen
to make) decisions and implement changes which allow our Armed Forces
to protect our sovereignty and assist our allies and neighbours.
While it is deemed a line of realism, there is credence in the notion
that if one wishes to maintain and uphold peace, one must prepare
for war. To show strength and capacity is a key deterrent to conflict.
And in this, by 2008, we should realise this doesn't simply pertain
to the massive scale land battles of old, but in protecting our
borders, our resources and our shipping lanes from a multitude of
threat types.
Across the three branches there is
a collective theme of equipment, supply and personnel issues which
negate proper capability to train, deploy and operate beyond the
minimal threat, peacekeeping level. Long term deployments would
not be reasonably sustainable. Government policy of the day does
not see this as pertinent. This disrupts warfighting capacity beyond
the Company level abroad, and creates a substantially capped capacity
for defence at home, should it ever be required. The latter, it
must be stressed, is the primarily purpose of Defence Forces though
there is no concrete statement to this end in current policy. This
includes and relates directly to logistical capacity in response
to civil emergencies.
If we want to demonstrate our willingness
to play a meaningful and ongoing part in the international community
we must recognise why the NZDF has suffered so many shortfalls,
properly address them and ensure we a) implement change to better
play our part, and b) take substantial measures to ensure this level
of degradation is avoided in the future. How we deal with these
issues affects our global image which in turn is central to our
ability to facilitate trade and enact policy of which we wish to
be part. To forego this can have a dramatic affect on our lives
at home and abroad as New Zealanders.
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